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Abstract—In a Multiple Cloud Collaborative Environment
(MCCE), cloud users and cloud providers interact with each other
via a brokering service to request and provision cloud services.
The brokering service considers several pieces of data to broker
the best deal between users and providers which can subsequently
risks the privacy and security of MCCE. In this paper, we
propose a Privacy Preserving Attribute-Based Encryption(PP-
ABE) scheme which protects MCCE from a compromised broker.
The proposed encryption scheme preserves the privacy by
employing data access policy over sets of attributes. The iden-
tifying attributes are anonymoized using pseudonyms. The data
access policy is further anonymized so as it remain unknown to
unauthorized parties. The PP-ABE achieves unlinkability between
different data items which flows through the collaborative cloud
environment and preserves the privacy of cloud users and cloud
providers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Multiple Cloud Collaborative Environment (MCCE) is emerg-
ing as the new facade of cloud computing. A multiple cloud
collaborative environment is conceptually similar to an e-
commerce platform where several cloud providers outsource
services to different users. International Organization for Stan-
dardization defines a cloud service broker (CSB) [1] as a
"cloud service partner that negotiates relationships between
cloud service customers and cloud service providers." Such
a collaborative environment is quiet different from traditional
cloud setup where all the resources belong to a single cloud
provider whereas in a multiple cloud environment resources
belong to different cloud providers. Each resource being com-
pletely distributed, heterogeneous, and totally virtualized. The
MCCE is facilitated by an intermediary (brokering service) for
efficient matching of cloud services (offered by a multitude of
service providers) to satisfy user requirements. A brokering
service is responsible for selecting optimal cloud resources to
deploy a service, optimally distribute the different components
of a service among different clouds, and to move a given
service component from one cloud to another to satisfy the
optimization criteria.
The basic components of MCCE under our consideration
are cloud service users, brokering service, and cloud service
providers. The steps of a typical transaction between different
components are underlined below. Cloud Service Providers
register their services with the brokering Service. Cloud Users
specify their requirements and preferences (under business
policy compliance) for selection of a reliable and trustworthy
cloud service provider. The service user negotiates Service
Level Agreement (SLA) with the service provider and make
a SLA contract. The brokering service (resource matching
module) selects and composites highly trusted resources and
allocates to users from the trusted resource pool. The brokering
service sorts high performance resources by analysing the
history information of the resources for dynamically providing
the highly trusted resources. Users provide ratings for cloud
service(s) at the end of transaction. The brokering service
collects locally-generated user’s ratings and aggregates with
the directly monitored state information i.e. Quality of Service
(QoS) attributes to compute the global evaluation score. The
global evaluation score is the overall degree of trust for a
cloud service (i.e. aggregation of user feedback and directly
monitored quality of service information).
It is imperative to underline the role of cloud brokering
service in service provisioning cycle; and it is more important
to do so for a multiple cloud collaborative environment. The
cloud brokering service can be vulnerable for MCCE and it
is therefore vital to adopt some security measures to control
its behavior. The brokering service discussed in [2] takes into
consideration cloud user’s requirements, preferences, business
policy and QoS attributes of cloud providers to perform the
above mentioned tasks. The storage and processing of such
detailed information records(consisting of both identifying and
non-identifying attributes) by a third party brokering service
raises the security and privacy concerns. The brokering service
can collude with the competitor cloud provider(s) or use the
information for marketing purposes etc. The privacy require-
ments of a MCCE are discussed below.
A. Requirements of a Privacy Preserved Multiple Cloud Col-
laborative Environment
• Unlinkability: There must not be any link(or connec-
tivity) between cloud user’s details and its require-
ments, preferences, and feedback such that it could
be used for malicious purposes.
• Anoymization: All the identifying details must be
anonymized to preserve the privacy of collaborating
entities.
• Control and Audit: The brokering service must not
black-list any user on the submission of a negative
feedback. The brokering service must not perform
maliciously and be bound by loyalty to a single cloud
service provider. It must not report wrong monitoring
data (i.e. modifies the QoS attributes) to support a par-
ticular cloud service provider. The brokering service
must not collude with the competitors cloud services
and harm the overall reputation of a trustworthy cloud
service provider.
B. Our Contribution
Privacy preservation is therefore the absolutely essential
requirement of every brokering service; it is indeed the
motivation of our research to propose a privacy preserving
encryption scheme for both the cloud users and cloud ser-
vice providers such that they are protected from any type
of malicious behavior of the brokering service.The security
and privacy can be guaranteed by considering the attribute
based encryption scheme. In this paper, we propose a pri-
vacy preserving attribute-based encryption scheme which uses
cipher-text policy to anonymize attributes in order to achieve
unlinkability between different data items which flows through
the collaborative cloud environment. Attribute Anonymyzation
is achieved by considering the hidden data access policy.
C. Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
section II, we present the most important studies related to
cloud brokering services and privacy preserving encryption
schemes. In section III, we discuss data access policy and the
basic terms we use in the rest of the paper. In section IV, we
present the privacy preserving scheme, while in section V we
provide a security analysis of our proposed scheme. Finally,
in section VI we conclude the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
We review recent studies related to cloud brokering ser-
vices(CBS) to underline their role, contribution, and require-
ments in cloud computing environments. We further review
some privacy preserving attribute base encryption schemes.
In [3] authors discuss the current practices and upcoming
challenges of cloud brokering. The legal and practical impli-
cations of cloud brokering are highlighted. It is maintained
that there can be different motivations(i.e. economical, special
security, compliance regulation or specific requirements) be-
hind the use of a brokering service but in any case the role
of brokering service in data processing chain and respective
liabilities must be clearly defined otherwise the security and
privacy issues would become complex. It is argued that the
brokering service must be independent and must not be bound
by loyalty to a single company. The legal frameworks appli-
cable to personal data must explicitly address the problems
of data location, cross-border transfer, portability, access and
accountability in wake of cloud brokering service appearing
as a new phenomenon in cloud computing.
An open federated cloud computing model called Reser-
voir is presented in [4]. The work is motivated by the fact
the cloud computing has the potential of becoming a future
service technology and that vision could be materialized
by addressing the deficiencies in current cloud models. The
identified deficiencies include 1) inherently limited scalability
of single-provider clouds, 2) lack of interoperability among
cloud providers, and 3) no built-in support for business service
management. The Reservoir Model proposes an architecture
where different cloud service providers can collaborate with
each other to create a seemingly infinite pool of IT resources.
The Reservoir architecture [4] consists of multiple com-
ponents like service provider, infrastructure provider, virtual
execution environment(VEE), reservoir site, reservoir cloud
and various other sub-components. A service application is
executed and deployed on a number of virtual hosts to ensure
an on-demand provision of resources and services. The paper
does not discuss the roles(i.e. data owner, data controller, and
data processor) and liabilities of these various components in
service provisioning cycle. The lack of focus on these aspects
affects the end user and risks it privacy and security.
A cloud brokering service based on the resource allocation
perspective is proposed in [2]. The T-Broker service is a
middle-ware for cloud trust management and service matching.
T-Broker monitors the cloud services and computes the overall
trust degree of the cloud service provider by aggregating the
experience-based trust and feedback trust. The experience-
based trust is computed by monitoring cloud services on five
kinds of QoS attributes(i.e. node spec profile, average resource
usage information,average response time, average task success
ratio, and the number of malicious access). The feedback trust
is computed from the ratings of the users. The computed trust
value is used to allocate the most trustworthy resources to users
as per their requirements. Again, the proposed scheme does not
discuss the security and privacy issues, the trustworthiness of
the brokering service and the ways to control any malicious
behavior on part of the brokering service.
The concept of a decentralized meta-broker for inter-
cloud setting is introduced in [5]. Meta-broker enables the
collaboration and inter-operation among several disperse (and
highly likely heterogeneous) clouds. The idea is to develop
coordination among different clouds for establishing a reactive
cross-exchange and service automation process while offering
transparency to users. Every cloud has a separate meta-broker
which acts on behalf of its clients to map user requests to cloud
data-centers. These meta-brokers establish inter-cloud collab-
oration by exchanging information such as list of datacenter
hosts, VMs, jobs (cloudlets) along with the characteristics of
the datacenter (e.g. hosts CPU, Memory, number of processing
elements (PEs), architecture etc.). This work recognizes the
exchange of information between meta-broker can lead to
security, privacy, and trust issues; and proposes the use of
encryption techniques such as a shared key authentication
process for fundamentally gaining secure access among clouds.
A privacy preserving constant size cipher-text attribute-
based encryption scheme is proposed in [6]. The two unique
features of this scheme are privacy preservation and hidden
data access policies. The recipient’s privacy is preserved by
leveraging a hidden data policy construction. In this scheme,the
cipher-text size remains constant with any given number of
attributes. Our proposed scheme follows similar approach with
[6] for user privacy preservation and attribute anonymization.
III. PRELIMINARIES OF PP-ABE
In this section, we discuss the notion of attributes, data access
policy, and anonymized data access policy. First, we define
these terms in an abstract way and then correlate them to a
collaborative cloud computing environment. Table I lists the
symbols we have used through out the paper.
A. Attributes, Policy, and Anonymity
Let U = {Ai } i ∈ [1, k ] be the Universe of attributes and
k is the number of attributes in the universe. Each attribute
Ai has 3 values: {A
+
i , A
−
i , A
∗
i }. Intuitively, A
+
i denotes the
user has Ai ; A
−
i denotes the user does not have Ai or it’s
not a proper attribute of the user. As for A∗i , it denotes a
"wild-card" value, which means policy does not care about
the value of attribute Ai. The attribute with a wild-card value
does not contain any identifying value and therefore does not
TABLE I. SYMBOLS AND THEIR DESCRIPTION
Symbol Description
U Universe of Attribute
Ai ith Attribute of user
k Number of attributes in the universe
L Attribute list of the user
P Data Access Policy
P Anonymized Data Access Policy
λ Security Parameter
e Bilinear Mapping
KP Public Key
KPAi Public Key of the ith Attribute
KM Master Key
KS Private Key of the User
KSAi Private Key of the ith Attribute
KSY M Symmetric Key
CT Cipher-Text
need to be privacy preserved. On the other hand, the attributes
with identifying values are anonymized using "do-not care"
values to preserve the privacy. When a user joins the system,
it is tagged with an attribute list defined as follows: A user’s
attribute list is defined as L = { L [ i ] i ∈ [1, k ] }, where L
[i ] ∈ {A+i , A
−
i }.
AND-Gate Access Policy: Let P = { P [ i ]}i ∈ [1, k
] be an AND- Gate access policy, where [ P ] ∈ {A+i , A
−
i ,
A∗i }. The access policy contains both identifying and non-
identifying attributes. We use the notation L ⊢ P to denote
that the attribute list L of a user satisfies P , as:
L ⊢ P ⇔ P ⊂ L
⋃
{A∗i }i ∈ [1, k]
A+i or A
−
i requires the exact same attribute in the user’s
attribute list. Effectively, each user with A+i or A
+
i fulfills
A∗i automatically.
Anonymized AND-Gate Access Policy: Accordingly, we
also define an Anonymized AND-gate policy that removes all
identifying attribute values, i.e. { A+i , A
+
i }, except wild card
values, i.e. A∗i . Formally, an anonymized AND-gate policy is
defined as follows: Let
P = P
⋂
{A∗i }i ∈ [1, k]
be an anonymized AND-gate access policy. We note that the
"do-not care" attribute values are included in the anonymized
access policy. If we hide the "wild card" attributes, the decryp-
tor will need to guess 2k possible access policies if there are
k attributes in the policy, i.e., for its value can be either A∗i or
the specific value (A+i or A
−
i ) assigned to the decryptor. This
would make the scheme infeasible in terms of performance.
The anonymity policy is defined as the state of being not
identifiable within a set of subjects, i.e., the anonymity set.
As the access policy is one-to-many mapped to users, we can
extend this definition of policy anonymity set of blinded policy
as the anonymity set of blinded policy P is the set of access
policies which are identically blinded to P . Here, we briefly
analyze the anonymity level of the blinded access policy. If
there are no "wild-cards" in the original access policy (hidden),
the blinded policy P will be empty. In this case, the size of
anonymity set is 2k, as there are j "wild-cards" in the original
access policy(hidden), the size of the anonymity set is 2k−j .
Bilinear Maps: A pairing is a bilinear map e: G0 × G0
→ G1, where G0 and G1 are two multiplicative cyclic groups
with large prime order p where the discrete logarithm problem
on both G0 and G1 is considered hard to solve. Pairing has
following properties:
• Bilinearity:
e(P a, Qb) = e(P,Q)ab, ∀P,Q ∈ G0, ∀a, b ∈ Z
∗
P .
• Nondegeneracy:
e(g, g) 6= 1
• Computability: A mapping is said to be computable
if an algorithm exists which can efficiently computes
e(P ,Q) for any P , Q ∈ G0 .
Complexity Assumption: The security of our proposed
scheme is based on a complexity assumption called the Bilin-
ear Diffie-Hellman Exponent assumption (BDHE).
Let G0 be a bilinear group of prime order p. The K-BDHE
problem in G0 is stated as follows: given the following vector
of 2K+1 elements (Note that gα
K+1
is not in the list):
(h, g, gα, gα
2
, ..., gα
K
, gα
K+2
, ....gα
2K
) ∈ G20k + 1
as the input and the goal of the computational K-BDHE
problem is to output e(g,h)
αK+1
.
Decisional K-BDHE: The decisional K-BDHE assumption
is said to be held in G0 if there is no probabilistic polynomial
time adversary who is able to distinguish
〈
h, g, Yg,α,K , e(g, h)
α(K+1)
〉
and 〈
h, g, Yg,α,K , e(g, h)
R
〉
with non-negligible advantage, where α,R ∈ ZP and g, h ∈
G0 are chosen independently and uniformly at random.
B. Privacy Preservation for MCCE
As has already been mentioned, the different entities in
multiple cloud collaborative system interact with each other to
request cloud service(s), provide cloud service(s), and broker
the services between the cloud user(s) and cloud provider(s).
An interaction between any of the two entities takes place
on the basis of pre-agreed terms and conditions (i.e. Ser-
vice Level Agreement(SLA) and policies). The policies and
SLA(s) in turn consist of various data tuples and each tuple
consist of several data attributes. Some of the data attributes
contain the identifying information (i.e. IDs, personal details
etc.) which must not be revealed to other entities in the
system. Table II shows some attributes of cloud users such
as ID, Name,Requirement, Feedback, Preferences, SLA,
and Cloud Provider ID. Apart from ID and Name all other
attributes are denoted by a unique identifier for that particular
attribute. RQID1 denotes the requirements identifier for cloud
user CU1. Similarly, FD1 , PRID1, SLAID1, and CP1
denotes the feedback, preferences, SLA, and cloud provider
identifiers respectively. The attributes ID and Name represent
user’s personal details whereas other attributes represent the
linked information. We believe that the identifying attributes
must be anonymized in order to preserve the privacy of the
user(s). The anonymization is achieved by a hidden data
access policy that specifies which attributes are to be disclosed
and which not. The identifying attributes are anonymized by
pseudonyms which are obtained from the registration authority.
Table III lists data access policies (P1 and P2) and
anonymized data access policies (P1, P2) for cloud users
CU1 and CU2 respectively. The anonymized data access policy
TABLE II. CLOUD USER ATTRIBUTES
Attributes L(1) L(2) L(3) L(4) L(5) L(6) L(7)
Description CUID Name Requirement Feedback Preference SLA CPID
CloudUser1 CU1 Alice RQID1 FD1 PRID1 SLAID1 CP1
CloudUser2 CU2 John RQID2 FD2 PRID2 SLAID2 CP2
TABLE III. DATA ACCESS POLICY AND HIDDEN DATA ACCESS POLICY
Attributes L(1) L(2) L(3) L(4) L(5) L(6) L(7)
Description CUID Name Requirement Feedback Preference SLA CPID
PolicyP1 A
+
1 A
+
2 A
+
3 A
−
4 A
+
5 A
+
6 A
+
7
PolicyP1 A−−$−− A−−$−− A∗ A∗ A∗ A∗ A−−$−−
PolicyP2 A
+
1 A
+
2 A
+
3 A
−
4 A
+
5 A
+
6 A
+
7
PolicyP2 A−−$−− A−−$−− A∗ A∗ A∗ A∗ A−−$−−
Fig. 1. Privacy Preserved Multiple Cloud Collaborative Environment
specifies the user details by "do not care" and "wild card"
attributes. A−−$−− denotes “do not care” attribute which
means value is hidden (or privacy preserved) and A∗ denotes a
"wild card" value which means the policy does not care about
the value of the attribute.
Whenever the cloud user sends some information to the
brokering service or to cloud provider its identifying attributes
are replaced with the "do not care" attribute values. The
receiving party will verify the sender details by contacting
the registration authority which confirms the registration of
such a user. Upon verification from registration authority, the
brokering service will respond to the query. Anonymizing
the identifying details with pseudonyms preserves the user’s
privacy. Similar attribute tables and anonymized data access
policy tables can be created for cloud providers and brokering
service.
IV. DESCRIPTION OF PP-ABE
In this section, we introduce our scheme which satisfies the
above mentioned requirements and offers a privacy preserving
mechanism for the users (i.e. cloud users and cloud providers)
of a multiple cloud collaborative environment. Figure ??
shows the basic components of the scheme which includes
cloud user(s), cloud service provider(s), registration authority
(RA), and brokering service. Cloud users, cloud providers
and brokering service all get registered with the registration
authority. The registration authority asks for a number of
attributes and upon verification creates secret keys for them.
There are a number of attributes in the system. The registration
authority also generates various parameters which are used by
different algorithms. Our scheme consists of four fundamental
algorithms:
1) Setup(1λ, k)
2) Key Generation
3) Encryption
4) Decryption
A. Setup(1λ, k)
The RA initiates the setup process. There are total k
attributes in the system. The setup algorithm takes input of
the security parameter 1λ and the number of attributes(k) in
the system. λ denotes the size of the prime number which is
the order of the cyclic group in bi-linear mapping. The size
of prime number is usually λ bits long. The setup algorithm
returns public key KP and master key KM . The public key
KP is used for encryption while the master key KP is used
for private key generation.
B. Key Generation —KeyGen(KP , KM , L)
The KeyGen algorithm takes the public keyKP , the master
key KM and the user’s attribute list L as input. It outputs the
private key KS of the user.
C. Encryption —Encrypt(KP , M , P )
The encrypt algorithm takes the public key KP , the mes-
sage M and the specified access policy P (over the universe
of attributes) as input. The algorithm outputs cipher-text CT
such that the only users whose private keys satisfy the access
policy can decrypt the message. The cipher-text also associates
the anonymized access policy P .
The encrypt algorithm is based on hybrid encryption
scheme which can be constructed using public key encryption
and symmetric key encryption schemes. The encryptor first
encrypts the message using a symmetric key KSYM and then
re-encrypt it using the public key KP and the public keys of
the attributes specified in the access policy.
D. Decryption —Decrypt(KP , KS , CT )
Before performing decryption, the receiver has little infor-
mation about the access policy that is enforced over the cipher-
text. Only if L ⊢ P then user can successfully recover the valid
plain text and access policy. Otherwise, user can only get a
random string which can be easily detected. Moreover, the ac-
cess policy remain unknown to the unsuccessful decryptor(s).
It takes the public key KP , the private key KS of the user
and the cipher-text CT , which only includes the anonymized
access policy as input. It returns a valid plain-text M if the set
of attributes of the private key satisfies the access structure of
the cipher-text.
Note: Each public key is mapped to an attribute value,
including Ai. To encrypt a message, the encryptor specifies
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an access policy P by assigning an attribute value (Ai ∈
{1, 0, ∗}) for each of the n attributes in the universe and
encrypts the message using public keys of the attribute values
in the P . Each decryptor is generated as a set of private key
components corresponding to attribute list L. All the private
key components of the same user are tied together by a
common random factor to prevent collusion attacks.
E. Example
We elaborate the execution of our proposed scheme by an
example in which the cloud user wants to send a message to
the brokering service. The steps of the encryption-decryption
process are shown in figure 2. The same steps will be followed
whenever a message is to be sent between any two parties in
the multiple cloud collaborative environment (MCCE).
Encryption
First of all the cloud user obtains registration authority’s
public key KP . It then generates a fresh one-time symmetric
key KSYM and encrypts the message Encrypt(M)KSY M
using the symmetric key just generated. The result of the
encryption is first part of cipher-text i.e. C0 which is then re-
encrypted Encrypt( Encrypt(M)
KSY M
)
KP [Ai]
using public
key KP and the public keys of policy attributes. This makes
the second part C1 of the cipher-text. The attributes are already
defined in pre-agreed data access policy between the cloud
User and the brokering service. The cloud user then specify
the data access policy P and anonymizes data access policy P
by removing the identifying attributes with the "do-not-care"
values. The cipher-text CT = (C0, C1, P ) is then sent to the
brokering service.
Decryption
To decrypt this hybrid cipher-text, the brokering service
do the following. It uses the data policy attributes to make a
guess of the access policy P . The brokering service then uses
the parts of private key to decrypt the first part of cipher-text
and retrieve symmetric key KSYM contained in. It then uses
this symmetric key KSYM to decrypt the message contained
in the second part of the cipher-text and retrieves the plain text
message M .
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we discuss the security analysis of PP-ABE
and further elaborate its robustness against some attacks.
A. Adaptive Chosen Cipher-text Attacks in PP-ABE
The PP-ABE is a hybrid encryption scheme which requires
both the public key encryption (PKE) and symmetric key
encryption (SKE) schemes to be secure against adaptive chosen
cipher-text attacks because it then inherits those properties as
well. Our proposed scheme is secure for both the encryption
approaches. The generation of public/ private key pairs using
bilinear-mapping makes it robust against key compromise
and indistinguishability attacks. The one-time generation of
the randomized symmetric key makes it hard to guess the
KSym symmetric key. Moreover, the K-BDHE complexity
assumption makes the PP-ABE more robust and secure against
common security vulnerabilities. The security of the PP-ABE
scheme is based on cipher-text indistinguishably i.e. indis-
tinguishably under chosen plain-text attack(IND-CPA) which
considers that the adversary should not learn any information
from seeing a cipher-text and it should not be able to do better
than a random guess. The goal of adversary in anonymous
attribute-based encryption system can be either one of the
following: 1) extracting information of plain-text from the
cipher-text or 2) distinguishing underlying access-policy in the
cipher-text.
The two goals of adversary can be integrated in the
indistinguishability against cipher-text-policy and chosen
cipher-text attacks (CP-IND-CCA). In this paper, we consider
indistinguishability against selective cipher-text policy and
chosen message attack (sCP-IND-CPA) [7] [8] [9]. The
definition is similar to CP-IND-CCA, although in sCP-IND-
CPA, the adversary has to submit its challenge attributes
before the setup phase. Here, the adversary is allowed to
control some users and access their attribute private keys
that do not match the cipher-text-policy. Note that, the
decryption oracle is not available to the adversary. The formal
definition is given based on the following sCP-IND-CPA
game between an adversary and a brokering service in MCCE.
Initial: The adversary commits to the challenge cipher-
text policies P0, P1 before setup algorithm.
Setup: The challenger chooses a sufficiently large security
parameter 1λ, and runs setup to get public key KP and master
secret key KS . It retains KS and give KP to the adversary.
Phase 1: The adversary can perform a polynomially bounded
number of queries to key generation oracle on attributes L, the
only restriction on attribute list L is that the it either satisfies
both the policies or it does not satisfy any policy,
L ⊢ P0 = L ⊢ P1 = 0 or
L ⊢ P0 = L ⊢ P1 = 1.
Challenge: The adversary outputs two messages M0 and M1,
and it wishes to be challenged with respect to P0 and P1.
It requires that M0 = M1 if any attribute private key on L
satisfying L ⊢ P0 = L ⊢ P0 = 1 has been queried. The
challenger randomly chooses a bit b = {0, 1}, computes CT
= Encrypt(KP , M , P ) and sends CT to the adversary.
Phase 2: The adversary continues to issue queries to the key
generation oracle, with the same restriction as before.
Guess: The adversary outputs a guess b´ for b. The adversary
wins the game if b = b´. The advantage of adversary in game
sCP-IND-CPA is considered as the probability that adversary
wins the game minus 1/2. This model can be considered to
be analogous to the selective-ID model [10] utilized in IBE
protocols. In their security model, the adversary should commit
to the challenge identity ID before the setup phase.
Pr[b = b´]−
1
2
The PP-ABE encryption scheme is fully secure if all poly-
nomial time adversaries have at most a negligible advantage
in sCP-IND-CPA. Our claim will remain true because of the
Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent (K-BDHE) assumption. The
decisional K-BDHE ensures that no probabilistic polynomial
time adversary would be able to guess the exponents for
the private keys of the attributes. The data access policy
is not revealed to any other user and the anonymity is not
compromised.
B. Security Attacks in MCCE:
It is essential to protect the MCCE against security threats
and vulnerabilities such that the colluding behavior of the
brokering service can be controlled. The privacy requirements
of the MCCE demand unlinkability of data, anonymity of users
IDs, and control and audit of the collaborating entities. The
privacy requirements of MCCE can be guaranteed if the PP-
ABE is secure against the following security vulnerabilities:
1) Breaking the Anonymity: As we have already been dis-
cussed in MCCE the privacy of cloud users and providers must
be preserved, such that no adversary can break the anonymity
of the identifying attributes and be able to link pieces of
information. The privacy is protected by considering the hidden
data access policy which is constructed using the "do-not-
care" (A−−$−−) and "wild-card" (A∗) terms. The identifying
attributes (IDs) are represented by "do-not-care" (A−−$−−)
terms. The RA defines the pseudonyms for each of the identi-
fying attribute i.e., the A−−$−− term. The pseudonyms are
generated by bi-linear mapping of cyclic groups with very
large prime order i.e. security parameter λ in PP-ABE. It is
computationally infeasible to guess the corresponding group
element. Moreover, no adversary can determine if some target
element is either a special combination of given parameters
or a random element because of the K-BDHE complexity
assumption of PP-ABE.
2) Data Modification: The other possible attack against any
encryption scheme is data modification. Its indeed the basic
security requirement of PP-ABE because the adversary can
modify the IDs, ratings, feedback and trust values which
can cost the entire collaborative environment. The PP-ABE
is a hybrid encryption which makes it secure against data
tampering. If an adversary is somehow able to steal the private
keys, he/she can not modify the plain-text message because of
the additional symmetric key encryption.
3) ID Spoofing: The adversary can impersonate as a a real
cloud user or a cloud service provider to get registered with
the RA. Once it does so it can gain access to the system
and make falsified service requests and provisions. The PP-
ABE is protected against the ID-spoofing attacks because of
the application of formally robust methods for secret key
generation. Whenever a user registers with the RA it submits
a list of attributes L. Each of the attribute is mapped to a
random number in cyclic group of prime order p, all those
numbers are then summed up together. It then goes through
other group operations and finally the cloud user ID CUID is
tied to another random element in G0. A similar process is
followed to generate the secret key KS . In any case, if some
adversary knows the attribute list of the user it can not submit a
registration request to get exactly the same user ID CUID and
secret key KS . This prevents the PP-ABE from ID-spoofing
attack.
4) White Washing: The PP-ABE is protected against the
white-washing attack due to mathematically sound nature of
applied techniques. The attack is facilitated by ID spoofing
attack which is not possible because of the reasons already
discussed above.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a privacy preserving attribute-
based encryption(PP-ABE) scheme for a MCCE. Our proposed
scheme is novel in a twofold manner: first, it preserves the
privacy of cloud users and providers; and second, it curtails
the malicious and colluding behavior of the brokering service.
The MCCE is protected against any security and privacy risks
if the brokering service is compromised. In future, we will
further work on the trust and privacy issues of the MCCE. We
aim to explore the trust from user’s perspective and see its
correlation with privacy. We will also investigate the effects of
human factors in establishment of trust.
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